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1TRADE UNION POWEP, LABOR MILITANCY AND WAGE INFLATION:
A Comparative Analysis*
Broadly speaking two views have dominated the literature on
postwar wage and price inflation: 'demand-pull' and 'cost-push.'
(2) Admittedly, the distinction is somewhat artificial, probably
more so now than in the past. Indeed, the emoirical results of
excess demand models of inflation are easily rationalized in
cost-push or 'sociological' terms -- a point T pursue further in
the main body of the paper. Conventional, demand-pull inflation
models imply that the percentage rate of change of money wages
depends essentially on the level of, and in some models the rate
of change of, excess demand for labor. The principal theoretical
controversy in the demand-pull literature (and one that has
obvious policy implications) is whether there is a stable,
long-run trade-off between the demand for labor (usually proxied
by a nonlinear function of the measured unemployment rate) and
the rate of wage and/or price inflation. The neoKeynesian
-- ;; -- --------- -------------------- ----------------- %--------
*This is one of a series of papers from my project on
industrial conflict and its conseguences supoorted by the
National Science Foundation. I am grateful to Nicholas Vasilatos
for able research assistance, to Henry Brady and Hartojo
Wignjowijoto for comments on an earlier draft, to Marilyn
Shapleigh for editorial advice, and to Suzanne Planchon for
typinq of the manuscript.
(1) A third view should also be acknowledged: the monetarist,
quantity theory. Models representing the quantity theory
framework are not examined in this paper. However, see the
comparative study by Nordhaus, 1972, who concludes "The strict
monetarist hypothesis is rejected whenever the evidence is
sufficient." (p. 439)
2position is that there is a long-run unemployment-inflation
trade-off (although many have abandoned this position in the
light of recent experience), whereas, the neoclassical stance is
that any such trade-off is merely a short-run, transitory
ohenomenon due to lags in adjustment between expected and actual
rates of inflation.
International factors aside, cost-push theories of wage
inflation usually take a social conflict or collective bargaining
orientation to wage formation and point to the influence of
'sociological' variables -- especially trade-union militancy or
labor 'pushfulnress.' At the core of the cost-push view is the
idea that trade-union action exerts significant upward pressure
on the rate of change of wages independently of excess demand for
labor, i.e. independently of market forces. Wage settlements
following recent outbursts of strike activity (e.g. May-June 1%68
in France, the "hot-autumn" of 1969 in Italy, nation-wide strikes
of coal miners in 1972 and 1974 in Great Britain) as well as the
poor performance of conventional models in explaining the general
wage inflation experienced by most western, industrial societies
since the late 1960's appears to have enhanced the status of
labor militancy, cost-push theories among orthodox economists.
(1)
The main body of this paper examine s various demand-pull and
cost-push models of wage inflation against annual postwar data on
(1) See, for example, Perry, 1975 and the discussion in parts II
and r17.
3hourly compensation of manufacturing employees in four industrial
societies: Italy, France, Great Britain, and the United States.
(1) The principal aim of the paper is to show that the "power"
and "militancy" of trade unions play an important role in the
dynamic process of wage determination in a diverse group of
industrial societies. Contrary to the usual practice, I
summarize the main assumptions, arguments and conclusions of the
paper here rather than at the end:
(i) The existence of a long-run unemployment-wage inflation
trade-off (Phillips curve) requires (a) money illusion on the
part of labor and/or (b) trade union weakness in wage bargaining.
(ii) I am persuaded on a priori grounds by the
neoclassical-accelerationist position that widespread money
illusion is implausible and argue that less than full wage
adjustment to nontrivial episodes of price inflation is most
likely due to the weakness of organized labor in collective
bargaining.
(iii) The empirical results show that the long-run
coefficient of adjustment of manufacturing wage changes to price
changes is less than unity only in the U7nited States, i.e. only
in the U.S. is there any evidence of a non-vertical long-run
Phillips-curve.
(1) -Th rouqho ut -T h ep paper-__ use_ -"wag_ es"11 and " Icompensation"
interchangeably, although, they are of course distinct. All
empirical results pertain to the latter.
4(iv) The rate at which wages adjust to prices as well as the
long-run magnitude of the adjustment coefficient are interpreted
as a reflection of trade-union power in wage bargaining.
Pank-orderinq of the countries along these lines is consistent
with the qualitative judgement of industrial relations
specialists about the comnarative 'power' of the various
trade-union movements; particularly the comparative 'weakness' of
organized labor in the United States.
(v) In all four countries trade-union militancy (which
should be distinguished from trade-union power), as measured by
strike activity, exerts sizeable effects on the rate of change of
manufacturing wages independently of market forces. However, in
most cases trade union action has not systematically contributed
to accelerating wages and prices, except perhaps in recent years
when "real wage resistance" has persisted in the face of chanqes
in relative Prices in favor of food and fuel producers.
(vi) Outside the United States (and other countries with
relatively 'weak' trade-union movements) wage and price stability
probably cannot be achieved without union acquiescence to some
form of incomes policy -- unless, of course, political
authorities are willing to run the economy at a !erl low (and
politically infeasible) level of activity. The post-war
experience suqqests that barring major political changes such
union cooperation is not likely to be forthcoming in any of the
countries examined here with the partial exception of Great
Britain; even there it has taken the conjunction of a Labour
5Government facing an extraordinary economic crisis to elicit
voluntary trade-union restraint.
i EXCESS DEMAND MODELS
Simple Phillips Curve
The point of reference for most contemporary treatments of
wage inflation is A.W. Phillips' seminal study (1958) of the
relation between unemployment and the rate of change of money
wages in the United Kingdom over the neriod 1861-1957. Phillips
employed somewhat unorthodox statistical procedures in his
analysis, but his plots of the percentage rate of change of wages
against the unemployment rate revealed a nonlinear, inverse
association (convex towari the origin) which was replicated in
many subsequent studies and is now wilely known as the "Phillips
curve." Phillips rationalized his empirical results with an
excess demand argument that most work in this tradition has
adopted:
"When the demand for labour is high and there are very few
unemployed we should expect employers to bid wage rates up
quite rapidly, each firm and each industry being continually
tempted to offer a little above the prevailing rates to
attract the most suitable labour.... On the other hand it
appears that workers are reluctant to offer their services
at less than prevailing rates when demand for labour is low
and unemployment is high so that wage rates fall only very

7(1b) w' (t) = bO + b1 1/U(t) + b2 AUJ(t)
where: w' = the percentage rate of change of wages (hourly
compensation of employees in manufacturing) computed as 100 times
the first backward difference of the natural logs;
U = the civilian unemployment rate;
AU = the first backward difference of U.
For purposes of comparison with the more realistic models
introduced below, estimates of the simple Phillips curve model
are reported in the first column of Tables lia-Id. (The Tables
appear at. the end of the paper.) It will come as no surprise to
those familiar with the contemporary wage determination
literature that the simple excess demand, Phillips curve
hypothesis does a poor job explaining the post war wage
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inflation. In all four countries the Y 's are low, the
reqressior standard errors relatively high, and T(t) has the
wrong sign (positive). The level unemployment rate term, 1/U(t),
is properly signed (positive) in all regressions but reaches
conventional statistical significance only in the equation for
Italy.
The most obvious empirical shortcoming of the 'naive'
Phillips model is that no account is taken of movements in
prices. hillips did not ignore prices altogether; rather he
advanced a threshold hypothesis in which price changes affected
the wage bargain only when they threatened to reduce real wages,
8i.e. only when the rate of change of prices was greater than the
rate of change of wages (p' > w'). Since in Phillips' sample
real waqes rarely fell over a sustained period, a price term was
not explicitly incorporated into his wage equation.
Phillips Curve with Con tempor aneous Price Changes
Among the first to build price changes directly into the
wage equation was Lipsey (1960). However, lipsey's most
important contribution was his attempt to tie the
inflation-unemployment (Phillips curve) trade-off to conventional
supply and demand economic analysis. Without reproducing the
details here, Lipsey developed an argument showing that
(i) the proportional rate of change of money wages is a linear
function of the ratio of excess demand to total labor supply, and
(ii) t he unobserved excess demand ratio is approximated by a
negatively sloped, nonlinear function of the observed
unemployment rate, U.
Lipsey's disequilibrium wage adjustment model was generally
taken to be a strong theoretical rationalization of the empirical
Phillips curve. (1) Lipsey also developed an ingenious
explanation -- which centered on the consequences of aggregating
individual market trade-off curves across markets -- for the
aggregate association observed by Phillips between the rate of
(1) Objections on theoretical grounds were, of course, raised.
See, for example, Corry and Laidler, 1967. The accelerationist
argument is treated in the next section.
9change of wages and the rate of change of unemployment, [1. (1)
The empirical form of Lipsey's model is simply the naive
Phillips curve equation with a term for contemporaneous price
changes.
2) w'(t) = bC + b1 1/U(t) + b2 p'(t) + b3 U'(t)
where: p' = the percentage rate of change of prices (computed
by the difference-log method described previously) and all dther
terms are as defined earlier.
Since the Phillips curve argument does not depend heavily on
U'(t) and this term was irsignificant in all regressions (studies
using this class of models typically find b3 = 0), the results
reported in the second column of '"ables la-Id are based on
equations omitting the rate of change of unemployment term. The
estimates for this model yield little evidence in favor of the
conventional Phillips curve argument. The coefficient of the
unemployment or excess demand term 1/U(t) has a perverse (i.e.
wrong) sian in the equations for 'France and Great Britain, and is
insignificant in the regression for Italy. Moreover, the
coefficient of the contemporaneous price change term p'(t) is not
significantly different from unity in the regressions for France
and Great Britain and is siqnificantly greater than unity in the
(1) Lipsey used the proportional rate of change of the
unemployment rate (U') in his study rather than the simple rate
of change ( AU) used in equation 1. Phillips appears to have had
the latter in mind, but I found that it made little difference:
regressions using U'(t) produced results very similar to those
reported in column 1 of the Tables.
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equation for Ttaly. (1) This result alone is sufficient to deny
the Phillips curve thesis for it implies that the wage bargain is
struck in real rather than money terms and, therefore, there
cannot be a trade-off between the nominal phenomenon of money
wage inflation and a real qu'antity such as the unemployment rate.
(2) This point is pursued further in the next section. Only for
the United States do the estimates for equation (2) support the
(wage) inflation-unemployment trade-off view. The results in
column 2 of Table 1d show a significant positive parameter
estimate for 1/U(t) and an estimate for p'(t) (0.58) that is many
standard errors less than unity.
Price Fxpectations Dhillips Curves
The Phillips-Lipsey trade-off model implies that high rates
of inflation yield long-term benefits in the form of lower
unemployment. This view is plausible on theoretical grounds only
if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(1) A similar estimate of the elasticity of manufacturing wages
with respect to prices for postwar Italian data is reported by
Sylos-Labini (19-74), who surprisingly does not comment on its
implications. As it turns out (see the following sections) , the
long-run elasticity is on the order of 1.C.
(2) I am inclined to pay greater attention to the coefficient of
p' than U1 in evaluating the Phillips curve thesis since it can be
arqued with some justification that during the postwar period
unemployment and other measures of aqqregate demand have not
varied enough to permit a sharp estimate of the excess demani
coefficient. For all of the countries treated in this study the
coefficient of variation ( s /X ) of p' is substantially greater
than that of U.
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1) Workers value, at least to some extent, nominal wage
increases alone; i.e. a significant fraction of the labor force
suffers from 'money illusion.' And/or
2) Other things being equal, labor organizations are not
powerful enough vis-a-vis management to obtain full waqe
adjustment to price increases.
Among economists, the trade-off debate has hinged largely on
the plausibility of the first condition. For example, Tobin
(1968) summarizes the theoretical foundation of the Phillips
curve this way:
"The Phillips curve idea is in a sense a reincarnation of
the original Keynesian idea of 'money illusion' in the
supply of labor. The Phillips curve says that increases in
money wages -- and more generally, other money incomes --
are in some significant degree prized for themselves, even
if they do not result in equivalent qains in real income."
(1)
PEconomists working in the strict neoclassical tradition
attack this idea pointing out that even though wages are set in
money terms, the wage determination nrocess is essentially a
--- ---------------------------------------------------------
(1) In The General T heory (1936) Keynes wrote "The workers...
resist reductions of money wages... whereas they do not resist
reductions of real wages.... Every trade union will put up some
resistance to a cut in money-wages, however small. But since no
trade union would dream of striking on every occasion of a rise
in the cost of living, they do not raise the obstacle to any
increase in aggregate employment which is attributed to them by
the classical school." (pp. 14-15.)
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bargain for real wages conditioned by the forecasts of buyers'
and sellers' of labor of the behavior of prices over the contract
period. Hence Friedman (1968), Phelps (1967, 1968) and others
argued, persuasively in my view, that any steady rate of
inflation will eventually be anticipated fully by economic actors
and that wage adjustment to expected price inflation will be
complete, i.e. the long-rIu elasticity of wages with respect to
prices will be unity. In this view the Phillips curve is merely
a short-run, "statistical" phenomenon stemming from lags in
adjustment between expected and actual rates of price (and/or
waqe) inflation. In Friedman's words:
"There is always a temporary trade-off between inflation and
unemployment; there is no permanent trade-off. The
temporary trade-off comes not from inflation per se, but
from unanticipated inflation, which generally means a rising
rate of inflation. The widespread belief that there is a
permanent trade-off is a sophisticated version of the
confusion between "high" and "rising" that we all recognize
in simpler forms. A rising rate of inflation may reduce
unemployment, a high rate will not." (1968, p. 11)
The position of neoclassical, 'exnectations' theorists is,
then, that the wage equation should be specified in the form:
(3a) w'(t) = bO + bl 1/U (t) + h2 p*I(t)
where: p** = the expected rate of
price inflation.
1?
b2 can be interpreted as the parameter of money illusion. If b2
= 0, equation (3a) reduces to the simple Phillips curve model
introduced earlier. For 0 < b2 < 1 we have what essentially is
the Phillips-Lipsey model of the last section in which the
long-run trade-off between (wage or price) inflation and
unemployment is steeper (less favorable) than the short-run
Phillips curve. Friedman, Phelps and other strict expectations
theorists assert that b2 = 1. There is no money illusion in the
labor market, and the long-run Phillips curve is a vertical line
crossing the U axis at the "natural rate" of unemployment. The
only possible long-run trade-off is therefore between the rate of
change of real wages (w' - p') and the unemployment rate and/or
between the rate of acceleration of inflation and the
unemployment rate. (1)
(1) Evaluatinq (3a) at steady state, (i.e. at p' =p**), h2 = 1
implies
(w' - p') = f(U).
Any trade-off is therefore between changes in real wages and
unemployment (excess-demand).
Passing a price function through (3a) illustrates the
acceleration argument. Suppose p' follows the simple markup
scheme
p' = w' - x'
where x' = rate of change of labor productivity, and it is
implicitly assumed that any asymmetry in the system (which is
necessary for the existence of a conventional trade-off) occurs
in the wage equation. Hence, we have
o' = (bO - x') + b1 1/U + b2 v*'
which for b2 = 1 implies
d_-_ 1 d n = f(u).
dt p dtE
The trade-off is therefore between the rate of acceleration of
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Since price expectations are not measured directly,
empirical testing of (3a) requires that p*' be specified in terms
of observable variables. The conventional practice is to use
some function of actual price changes p'. For annual data the
hypothesis
(3b) p*I(t) p'(t)
is not unreasonable. Expectations may be fully embodied in
actual price changes averaged over a twelve month period. This
hypothesis was effectively tested by the estimation of equation
2. The results (in the second column of Tables la-1d) provided
strong support for the neoclassical or strict expectations
argument. The hypothesis b2 = 1 was rejected only for the United
States.
A second model for price expectations is the unconstrained,
finite autoreqressive scheme
r
(3c) p*I (t) = E a(i) p' (t-i)
in which expectations are generated by the weighted, finite sum
of current and lagged price changes.
inflation and the employment rate, and requires that workers be
continually 'surnrised' by new bursts of inflation (p'>p*').
The "natural rate" of unemployment is given by the root of
the equation
p' - ps" = 0 = (0 - x') + bI 1/U
-bl/(b0-x').
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The third model tried in this study incorporates the
adaptive expectations hypothesis
(3d) p*' (t) - p* (t-1) = (1-a) ( p' (t) - p*' (t-1) )
co i
p*S(t) = (1-a) E a p'(t-i)
i=O
p*'(t) = (1-a)/(1-aL) p'(t)
where: L is a lag operator.
In the adaptive model, price expectations are revised
linearly each period in proportion to some fraction of last
period's forecast error. The model implies that expections are
governed by an exponentially weighted moving average of observed
price changes.
Estimatior of the price expectations Phillips curve models
using the finite autoregressive and the adaptive schemes for p*'
rendered essentially the same results and so estimates of only
the former scheme are reported in the third column of Tables
1a-id. (1) The results for France, Great Britain and the United
States do not differ appreciably from the estimates of the
Phillips-Linsey model shown in column ?. The unemployment term
(1 heaapieprice expectations version was tested by
estimating the implied nonlinear equation
W ' (t) = bC (1-a) + a w' (t- 1) + b1 1/U(t)
-b1 a 1/U(t-1) + b2(1-a) p' (t).
The estimate of b2 was approximately unity in the regressions
for Ttaly France, and Great Britain. T experimented with lags of
various lengths in the finite autoregressive expectations models;
the tables report the best fitting equation.
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again has the 'wrong' sign in the regressions for France and
Great Britain and, more important, the sum of the price change
coefficients is just about unity. However, in the case of Great
Britain the sum of the autoregressive price coefficients (1.2)
exceeds the contemporaneous price coefficient of equation 2
(1.843) by a large enough margin to yield an increase in F2 and a
decrease in standard error of the regression. The price
expectations model estimates for the United States are
essentially the same as those of the static Phillips-Lipsey
equation: the parameter of the inverse of the unemployment rate
is positive and significant, and the elasticity of waqes with
respect to prices is on the order of 0.6. (1)
The estimate of the sum of the price change coefficients for
Italy represents the most important departure from previous
results. The coefficient of contemporaneous nrice changes o' (t)
in equation 2 was 1.65, i.e. was substantially larger than unity.
This, of course, implies that every burst of price inflation is
followed by a sizeable increase in real wages -- an implausible
result. (2) The sum of the coefficients of the p' (t-i) in column
(1) I ran a number of additional experiments for the U.S. testing
the idea (which appears from time-to-time in the literature) that
the coefficient of adjustment is closer to unity once a critical
threshold in observed rates of price inflation is reached. I
could find little support for this appealing hypothesis. Since -
do not find the "rational" expectations argument plausible on
theoretical grounds, experiemnts along these lines were not
tried.
(2) Adding the rate of change of labor productivity to the
contemporaneous price change model for Ttaly does not appreciably
alter this result: the parameter estimate of p'(t) is 1.6 and
the productivity term is insignificant. Adding productivity to
17
3, Table la shows that the long-run elasticity of wages with
respect to prices in Italy is not significantly different from
1.0. The time path of the price coefficients -- substantially
greater than unity at time (t), negative at times (t-1) and (t-2)
-- does indicate, however, that in the Italian system prices are
more or less continually chasing wages. (1) Clearly there is
little evidence of neoKeynesian money illusion. (2)
Why is the United States the only country of the four
industrial societies considered in this study to exhibit a viable
Phillips curve? (3) 1 doutt it is because workers and/or union
leaders in the United States, unlike their Italian, French, and
British counterparts, suffer from money illusion. In other words
I think it is unlikely, particularly in the manufacturing sector,
that a sizeable fraction of the labor force in any industrial
society is fooled by (or prizes to a significant degree) money
th~e uaTIon~s ~for~the~other -countriesdidnot yield anything
worth reporting either.
(1) The period-by-period price coefficients are: p'(t) 1.89,
p' (t-1) = -1.18, and p' (t-2) = -0.48.
(2) As in other studies of wage inflation there is some danger
that the price coefficients reported here suffer from
(simultaneous equations) bias. It is unlikely that this accounts
for the pattern of results but the only way to sort the matter
out definitively would be to employ a correctly specified 'large'
econometric model in which wages, prices, as well as employment
were jointly endogenous. I take heart in the fact that according
to Ezio Tarantelli, economist at the University of Florence and
consultant to the Bank of Pome, prices also 'chase wages' in the
Pank's econometric model of Italy.
(3) T do not mean to imply that the U.S. Phillips curve has been
stable over the postwar neriod -- there is a great deal of
evidence that it has not. See, for example, the comparative
analysis of Gordon, 1972.
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wage increases alone. A more plausible model would specify that
the elasticity of targgt wages with respect to expgcted prices is
unity, or very nearly so, at least in industrial labor markets.
If this idea has merit, then international variation in the rate
and equilibrium magnitude of the adjustment of observed wages to
price inflation reflects to some extent differences in the power
of trade unions to obtain target wage increases rather than money
illusion in labor markets. (1)
Recall that the pattern of results for the elasticity of wages
with respect to prices across the four countries was:
(1)Iam not saying that if trade unions did not exist the
elasticity of wages with respect of orices would I-e zero. This
is an absurd argument. Trade union power presumably makes a
difference on the margin; but the margin may be important enough
to determine whether there is a viable Phillips curve trade-off.
If equations in the form of 3 were estimated for a large number
of countries (or sectors or industries -- see the note on the
following page), then analyses of the following sort in princinle
could be undertaken.
a(i) = A + g(Xki)
where: a(i) = the long-run elasticity of observed wages with
respect to prices in the ith country (sector or industry)
k = nure "market" comoonent
g(Xki) = union"power" component
Xki = a vector of variables measuring the (relative) wage
bargaining power of trade unions.
A similar model might be specified for the rate of wage
adjustment, which might exhibit greater international
(intersectoral, interindustry) variation. Obviously the job of
identifying and measuring Xki and specifying q would not be
trivial. Until serious studies along these lines are undertaken,
the argument in the text will remain in large part speculative.
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Italy full wage adjustment to price
inflation in the long-run;
'prices chasing wages' in the short run
Great Britain full and more or less
and instantaneous (annual)
France wage adjustment to price
inflation
United states: less than full long-run
wage adjustment; viable
Phillins curve.
If one adopts the hypothesis that wage adjustment dynamics in
part reflect the power of organized labor in collective
bargaining, these results imply that (in the manufacturing sector
at least) trade unions are most powerful in Italy, strong in
Great Britain and France, and comparatively weak in the United
States. (1) Without attempting to discuss or reference the
voluminous literature here, I think it is accurate to say that
this rough rank ordering is consistent with the qualitative
assessment of most industrial relations specialists about the
comparative strength in wage harqaining of organized labor in
(1) My interpretation of these results is compatible with
intranational, cross-sectional studies finding that the
elasticity of wages with resnect to prices is higher in strongly
unionized industries than in weakly organized sectors. Fee
Pierson, 1968 (United States) ; Vanderkamp, 1 966 (Canada); and
Thomas, 1974 (Great Britain).
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these countries. (1)
Perhaps the best way to illustrate international differences
in trade union power is to contrast briefly the situation in the
two polar cases -- Italy and the United States. In Italy it is
extremely difficult for employers, even if hard pressed, to
dismiss workers. Moreover, the wages of most workers (nearly all
in the manufacturing sector) are peqged to the cost of living,
and escalator wage adjustment (scala mobile) takes place every
three months. More dramatic examples of institutionalized trade
union power are difficult to find. By comparison, in the United
States there are virtually no constraints on employers' rights to
discharge workers for economic reasons, and only the strongest
and most innovative unions have tried (with very limited success)
to bargain for cost of living wage escalator clauses. Wage
adjustment takes place almost wholly via periodic contract
renegotiation. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the
response of wages to price inflation in the United 5tates is hoth
less ranid and less complete than in Ttaly.
- ---- -------- ------------------- 
-----------------------------
(1) Note that in Ttaly and France, where the state is an
important actor in the (nrivate as well as public sector) labor
farket, i.e. is involved in setting wages, hours, and conditions
of work, trade union power to a great extent means the ability to
induce concessions from the government.
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I 'SOCIOLOGICAL', COST-PUSH MODELS
It was noted in the introductory section that the excess
demand class of wage inflation models are easily rationalized
from a cost-push or collective bargaining theoretical
perspective. (1) The empirical results presented in part I were
to some extent interpreted from this point of view. The purpose
of this section is to determine whether explicit indicators of
union 'pushfulness' or Labor militancy have significant influence
on the rate of change of wages independently of price movements
and unemployment. In other words we hope to learn whether
autonomous trade union actions exert significant upward pressure
on money wages, or whether discrete expressions of union
wilitancy merely represent a form of ritualized conflict
ratifying outcomes that market forces would have produced in any
case. A variety of direct and proxy measures have appeared in
the 'sociological' cost-push literature; the principal ones are:
(i) the level and rate of change of profits
(ii) the rate of change of the proportion of the labor force
in trade unions
(iii) subjective (ad hoc) estimates of labor militancy
(iv) strike activity.
The relevant models and empirical results are presented below.
(1) A more sustained argument along these lines is given by Rees,
1970.
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Profit-A uamente d Wage Changep 4odels
Among the first to challenge Phillips-type excess demand
models of wage inflation and to propose an alternative collective
bargaining theory in which profits played a central role was
Kaldor (1959). Kaldor argued that "the rise in money wages
depends on the bargajning strength of labor; and bargaining
strength, in turn, is closely related to the prosperity of
industry, which determines both the eagerness of labour to demand
higher wages and the willingness and ability of employers to
grant. them." (p. 293, emphasis in the orginal). Py prosperity
Kaldor clearly meant the rate of change of profits: "The rise in
wages is prompted by the rise in profits." (p. 294)
Kaldor's rather casually formulated theory was followed by a
series of empirical studies testing the impact of profits and the
rate of change of profits on the rate of wage inflation. (')
These studies produced rather mixed results and hence the thesis
that movements in profits are an imoortant influence on wage
changes remains problematic.
Comparative results for a profits augmented manufacturing
wage inflation model are reported in the fourth column of Tables
la-Id and are based on the equation:
(1) Powen, 1Q6C; Lipsey and Stpuer, 1961; Bhatia, 1961; Perry,
1964 and Bodkin, 1966. There is no unigue measure of the level
of profits. Profits as a percentage of stockholders' equity, the
ratio of profits to wage income, and the ratio of profits to
total income produced are all accentable indicators. The various
measures generally point in the same direction.
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(4) w'(t) = bC + b1 1/U(t) + E a(i) p'(t-i)
i
+b2 P/Y(t) + b3 AR/Y(t)
(P/W) ( V/W)
where: R/Y = manufacturing profits as a percentage
gross income produced (Italy, Great Britain);
R/W = manufacturing profits as a percentage
of employee compensation (U.S.) ;
and all other terms are as previously defined.
The regression estimates give little or no support to the profits
thesis. (1) The profit level term F/Y is significant but has the
wrong sign (negative) in the equation for Italy; elsewhere the
level of profits and the rate of change of profits variables have
negligible, perversely signed coefficients and very small
t-statistics. (2)
Contrary to Kaldor's argument these results indicate that in
the presence of unemployment and (especially) price inflation
variables, the profits terms have no systematic influence on the
rate of wage inflation. Fither union bargaining strength and
militancy have no appreciable effect on wage movements or orofits
variables are poor proxies for these concepts. Evidence
presented ahead suqgests the latter is true.
---------------------------------------------------
(1) I was unable to find manufacturing profits data for France
and so no results are reported in colum 4, Table lb.
(2) Models in which the profits terms were lagged performed no
better. Notice also the large, imolausible constants in the
equations for Italy and Great Britain.
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Wage Tnflatio and Trade .nion Mobilization
Perhaps the most forceful and influential argument that
trade unions affect the rate of change of wages independently of
the demand for labor was made in a series of papers by A.G. Hines
(1964, 1968, 1969). In his celebrated 1964 article in the -eview
of Fconomic Studies on wage inflation in the United Kingdom over
the 1893-1961 period, Hines showed that one measure of union
'pushfulness' -- the rate of change of the percentage of the
labor force unionized -- accounted for a sizeable fraction of the
variation in the rate of change of wages. Indeed, in the
inter-war and early post-war years, it appeared to be the most
important explanatory variable. (1) Hines rationalized the use
of changes in the density of unionization as a proxy for labor
pushfulness with the assumption that militancy is simultaneously
manifested in union recruiting drives and pressure on wage rates:
"a successful membership drive (is) a necessary accompaniment of
success in the wage bargain." (1969, pp. 67-68)
Hines# thesis implies a model of the form
(5) w'(t) = O + b1 1/U (t) + Z a(i) p'(t-i)
+b2 AT/L(t)
where: T/L = trade union membership (T) as a oercentage of
the labor force (L).
(1) Hines' last post-war observation was 1961. The importance of
this will become clear below. Similar results were reported by
Ashenfelter et al. (19'72) in their study of manufacturing wage
changes in the fnited States luring the neriod 1Q4-1963.
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Since union membership data for France and Italy are very
unreliable and, more important, the meaning of unionization in
these countries is not comparable to that in other western labor
mrovements, (1) equation 5 was estimated only for Great Britain
and the United States. The results anoear in column 5 of Tables
1c and Id.
The regression estimates yield only weak support for the
trade union mobilization hypothesis: the coefficient of AT/L
is properly signed in both regressions hut is insignificant in
the equation for Great Britain and only marginally significant in
the U.S. model.
Why do these estimates contrast so sharply with the
impressive results of the Hines and Ashenfelter et al. studies?
The reason undoubtedly is that by the mid- or late- 1950's union
mobilization is more or less complete and the small observed
fluctuations in the density of union membership no longer serve
as a very good proxy for variations in labor militancy in wage
bargaining. Models incorporating what I think are more direct
indicators of labor militancy are introduced in the next section.
(1) in Great Britain, the United States and most other western
systems union 'members' include all workers covered by contract
who merely pay dues, typically via an automatic check-off
(payroll deduction) method. In contrast, 'members' of the
largest (communist) unions in France and Italy are usually
militant activists. (Although in recent years the French CGT and
the Italian CGIL have tried to become mass organi7ations.) The
strength of French and Italian unions are probably judged better
by the number of workers they can mobilize for an activity rather
than by the number of their official members.
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Strike Activity and Wage Inflation
Dramatic outbursts of strike activity since the late 1960's
in Ttaly, France, Great Britain and several other countries led
to renewed attempts to incorporate labor agqressiveness
explicitly into models of wage inflation. The most recent effort
is Perry's comparative study done for the 1975, 71 issue of the
2291192.p Pp2rs on ----- 9 Activi-y. Perry called attention to
the increased militancy over wage issues in the late 1960's and
early 1970's, formulated a "battle over income shares"
interpretation of labor unrest, and on the argument that the
shares hypothesis could not be captured by a continuous variable
introduced dummy variables for the years of wage explosions in
the equations for the seven countries in his sample. Although
the "shares" dummy variables generally increased the fits and
enhanced the forecasting performance of his wage models, Perry's
approach is purely ad hoc and therefore is of limited scientific
value. (1)
A much more straightforward measure of trade union militancy
or pushfulness in waqe bargaining is strike activity. A numher
of earlier papers incorporated strike indicators into wage
(1) Predictably, the arbitrary charcter of Perry's test of the
militancy-shares hypothesis was nointed out during the discussion
of the paper. See the comments by Ackley and Nordhaus, EPFA,
4975, 2. For an earlier attempt to build subjective estimates of
trade union militancy into wage inflation models, see
Dicks-Mireaux and Dow, 1959.
27
determination rodels and the results typically supported the
militancy hypothesis. (1) The principal exception, and an
important one, is the comparative study by Ward and Zis (1974).
They concluded from their analysis of postwar wage inflation in
six countries that "the evidence...does not seem to support
strongly the cost-push (strike) hypothesis...." (p. 55).
Actually, Ward and Zis' conclusion is somewhat misleading: their
regressions showed one or more strike indicators to he
siqnificant variables in three of the six countries. Morover,
The Ward and Zis study suffers from at least three important
limitations:
(i) an explicit scheme for strike measurement is never
introduced and heavy reliance is placed upon the arbitrary index
developed by Galombos and Fvans (1q66) ; (2)
(ii) data on the strike indicators pertain to economy-wide
aggregates whereas the wage data are for the manufacturing
sector; (?)
(iii) Onlv contemporaneous strike activity appears in the
wage equations, yet strike induced wage increases are often not
fully observed until a year or more has elapsed.
(1) See Ashenfeter e1 al. , 1972 (United States) , Knight, 1972
(Great Britain), Sylos-labini, 1974 (Italy), Taylor in Parkin and
Sumner, eds., 1972 (Great Britain), Taylor, 1974 (Great Britain,
United States), and Swidinsky, 197? (Canada). An extended
qualitative discussion of British case is provided by Jackson, Pt
al., 1972.
(2) See Knowles, 1966 for a thorough critique of the Galombos and
Evans indices.
(3) This is also true of other studies of strikes and wage
inflation. Cf. the sources citied in the earlier note.
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The first objection raised above suggests that it is
important to develop a conceptual scheme for strike measurement
before undertaking empirical analysis. The International Labor
Otfice complies and publishes data on three basic components of
industrial conflict that are supplied by the national labor
ministries: the number of strikes, the number of workers
involved (strikers), and the number of man-days lost in strike
activity. Arrual data on these components are reported for
economy-wide totals and for nine separate sectors of economic
activity. In this paper we are interested only in manufacturing
strike activity.
Followinq the earlier, seminal work of Forcheimer, Knowles,
and Goetz-Girey and the more recent work of Shorter and Tilly,
(1) the basic industrial conflict variables are used in
conjunction with data on manufacturing wage and salary employment
to form three theoretically distinct dimensions of strike
activity: the average size of strikes, i.e. the number of workers
involved per strike; the average duration of strikes, i.e.
wan-days lost per worker involved; and a labor force-adjusted
treasure of strike freguency, i.e. the number of strikes ner
number of manufacturing employees.
Size: workers involved (strikers)/strikes
(1) Worcheimer, 194P; Knowles, 19r2; Goetz-Girev, 1963; and
Shorter and "'illy, 1971.
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Duration: man-days lost/strikers (1)
Freguenc: strikes/civilian wage and salary workers.
It is advantageous, to array these variables into a
three-dimensional solid or cube depicting the typical profile or
"shape" of strike activity in a particular nation during a
particular time period. Fiqure 1 displays two distinctive,
hypothetical strike shapes. Perhaos the most suitable index of
overall strike activity is a quantity akin to the physical
concept of volume, which of course is simply the product of the
three dimensions depicted in 'iqure 1:
Strike Voluire = Frequency X Duration X Size
an-days lost workers
per number of strikes X man-davs_ X involved
employees employees workers strikes
involved
(1)Noti~e that stikIe~duration is calculated from the available
aggregate data by dividing total man-days lost by the total
rumber of strikers, which yields a "weighted" average duration
(as opposed to a simple arithmetical average computed from
individual disputes) -- the weights being proportionate to the
number of workers involved in the strike. For example, if wl, w2
w are the number of workers involved in strikesl,2...n,
and if d2 ... dn are the corresponding durations of these
strikes (in aays), the number of man-days lost m, m2  *.. mn
d1 w 1, d2w2 , ... d w . The Total number of man- days lost is M =
mi +m 2+ ... +mn, Rn'd the total number of workers involved is W= w.
+w2+ +wn. The weiqhted average duration defined in the text
is therefore
M m+M2 ... m d w +d2 2+...+dw
Duration = - = 1 1 2 .n
W we2 '' n 1 2+.n'
where the weights are the number of workers involved in each
dispute. The Practical significance of this is that the duration
measure is heavily influenced by large-scale strikes.
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Man-days lost from strikes per number of employees has both
theoretical justification (being the volume of a
three-dimensional profile that characterizes strike activity at
any time or place) and obvious intuitive appeal as a
Fiqure 1 About Here
comprehensive index of industrial conflict.
Cost-push models incorporating the strike dimension
variables as the indicators of labor militancy in wage bargaining
were estimated in the following general form:
(6) w'(t) bC + bi 1/U(t) + E a(i) p'(t-i)
i
+ Z ci) S (jt -i)
ii
where: Sj = manufacturing sector strike dimension variables.
Regression experiments based on equation 6 were tried for various
combinations of strike variables and time lags. On a priori
grounds T expected strike volume (mandays lost per number of
manufacturing employees) and strike frequency (the number of
strikes per number of manufacturing employees) to have the
biqqest effects on movements in wages -- strike volume because it
is the most comprehensive indicator of labor militancy and strike
frequency because it represents the number of aqgressive labor
actions of whatever duration and size. (1) Strike size depends
(1) Te -o--c-u-r--nce---of--a--s-t-r-i-ko---f----o-u-r-se---
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largely on the scale of firms or, more important, the scalp of
the bargaining unit and therefore it was not anticipated to
exhibit any systematic influence on wage inflation. Increases in
strike duration beyond a certain (and probably rather low)
threshold are unlikely to influence the wage settlement
substantially and T think in most cases reflects the stuborness
of the oarties in accepting the inevitable outcome. So I did not
expect duration to be a very strong predictor of wage charges
either.
Although the logic of these a priori hunches may be faulty,
they were strongly supported by the empirical results: the
coefficient estimates in column 6a, Tables la-id show that in
each of the four countries strike volume or strike frequency or
both had sizeable and significant effects on the rate of wage
inflation. in every case the strike equations yield a
substantially higher corrected multiple correlation and a lower
standard error of the regression than the rival models discussed
earlier. With the exception of the strike frequency variable in
the regression for France, a one year lag on the strike terms
produced the best fits. (1) official statistics on French st-rike
activity in 1968 have never been published and therfore the model
for France includes a dummy (binary) variable to pick up the
---------------------- 
----------
extent on the behavior of both labor and manaqement (and/or
government) but the vast majority of strikes are labor initiated.
(1) Frequency data for the manufacturing sector were not
available for France and therefore the economy-wide frequency is
used as a proxy.
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effects of the great May-June 1948 general strike. The
coefficient of the dummy variable implies that the 1968 strike
wave produced an increase in manufacturing hourly wages between 7
and 8 percent greater than what would have otherwise been
expected. (1)
The excess demand term 1/U remained insiqnificant in the
equations for italy and France, and dropped to insiqnifi.cance in
the U.S. regression. (2) Hence the inverse of the unemployment
rate variable was deleted from the equations for these countries.
(Estimates for the revised waqe models are reported in columns
6b-6c of the tables.) Tn the strikes model for Great Britain,
however, the 1/U term (for the first time) achieves significance.
That is, net of strike volume and strike frequency, the level of
excess demand for labor appears to exert significant influence on
the rate of wage inflation. Tt has been suggested (see, for
example, Feldstein, 1973) that the breakdown of the
unemoloyment-wage inflation connection in Great Britain, which
was first noticed in the late 1960's, was due in part to upward
adjustments in unemployment compensation initiated by the Labour
Government in the latter part of 1966. However, the results for
(1) This estimate appears to be right on tarqet. The aqreement
which ended the 1968 workers' strike, the Protocole de Grenelle,
provided for wage increases of 4.5 to 5 percent on June 1, and
another ?.5 to 3 percent on October 1.
(2) Since large fractions of the italian and French labor forces
were until recent years employed in agriculture, a
nonagricultural unemployment rate variable was also tried in the
equations for these countries. This alternative measure of the
demand for labor did not yield significantly different results,
however.
model 6b in Table ic show that the location and slope of 1/T(t)
are stable over the post- 1967 period. The reason for the
revival of the 1/11(t) term is, I believe, that the usual inverse
association between unermlovment and labor militancy (1) broke
down in Great Britain in the mid- 1 960's (perhaps because of the
change in unemployment compensation emphasized by Feldstein and
others). Thus Great Britain experienced steadily increasing
strike activity in the face of rising measured unemployment.
Only after the effects of strike activity are netted out,
therefore, does the excess demand-wage inflation linkage in Great
Britain show up in the regressions. (2) This implies that the
tightness of labor markets (level of aggregate demand) has
contributed to the postwar British inflation.
The coefficients of the rate of change of prices are
generally smaller in the strike equations than in the
expectations models discussed earlier. These results are not
surprising in view of the sizeable correlations among the strikea
and price variables. (More on this in a moment.) What they
suggest is that the more or less complete adjustment of wages to
prices observed in the pure expectations models for Prance ani
Great Britain, as well as the part-ial adjustment estimated for
the United States, depend imnortantly on labor militancy as well
--------------------- -------------------------- 
-------
(1) On this point see Hibbs, 1 976a and the sources cited therein.
(2) The correlation between measured unemployment and strik-a
activity is strongly positive during the latter postwar years in
Great Britain. "he conclusion in the text is readily
demonstrated using standard specification error algebra.
35
as trade-union "power." In other words, trade-union strike
action is an essential mechanism for the adjustment of wages to
prices in these countries.
In contrast, the results of the strike equations for Italy
show that the sum of the price coefficients is still essentially
unity -- indeed as I noted earlier prices typically are chasing
wages. (1) This implies that full wage adjustment in Italy does
not hinge directly on the incidence of strike activity, which
squares with our earlier observations about the power of Italian
trade-unions.
Since strike activity is known to be influenced by current
and lagged values of unemployment and prices, (2) perhaps the
strike terms in Equation 6 merely register the effects of these
omitted economic variables. Quasi-reduced form reqressions
including appropriately lagged umemployment and price inflation
terms were therefore estimated to quard against this possibility.
(3) The results appear in column 7, Tables la-id. Although the
t-statistics of the strike variables are generally smaller in
these regressions, it is clear that the strike activity
(1) That is, the p' (t) coefficient is substantially greater than
1.0 and the p'(t-2) coefficient is sizeable and negative.
(2) See the evidence and references in Hibbs, 1976a.
(3) Prior work indicates that the untransformed unemployment
rate, U, is the best predictor of strike activity and so this
variable is used in the regressions. The time index on U
corresponds to the index and the index lagged one period of the
strike variable(s). For example, if the strike variable appears
in the original equation at time (t-1), U(t-1) and U(t-2) enter
the quasi-reduced form regression. The price inflation variables
are specified at time (t) , (t-1) , and (t--).
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coefficients are very robust in the face of a rather severe test.
(1) Tt seems very unlikely, then, that the estimated influence
of labor militancy on wage inflation merely reflects the effects
of present or past states of aggregate economic activity.
Just how important are the labor militancy terms relative to
the macroeconomic variables in explaining wage inflation? There
are several ways to approach this question. One method is to
look at the 'beta' or standardized regression coefficients. (The
square of these coefficients gives the proportion of the variance
of the rate of change of wages that can be uniquely attributed to
a particular variable.) Beta coefficients for each term in the
best strike-augmented wage equation are renorted in Table 2. (2)
Although the beta coefficients of the strike terms are somewhat
smaller than those of the macroeconomic variables, they are
sizeable and show that a nontrivial proportion of the variation
in wage inflation is due to fluctuations in strike activity.
However, this much was already fairly clear from earlier results
-- tha strike wage equations exhibited substantially higher 12 's
than alternative models.
Perhaps a better way of assessing the relative importance of
labor militancy is to compute the products of ordinary regression
(1) Cince strike activity responds to prior movements in real
wages rather than morey wages (see the study cited in Hibbs 1976a
above) , quasi-reduced form regressions in which real wage change
terms renlaced the price terms were also estimated. Again, the
strike activity coefficients were robust.
(2) The "best" strike models from Table I are 6h for Ttalv, 6c
for Prance, 6a for Great Britain, and 6c for the United States.
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coefficients times the means of the associated variables over
time intervals of interest. The second and third rows of Table 2
show the resulting effect estimates, i.e. the average impact of
unemployment, prices, and strike activity on the rate of wage
inflation, for two periods: 1955-64 and 1965-74.
Again, it is obvious from the biXi quantities
Table 2 About Here
that the strike variables have contributed importantly to the
rate of increase of manufacturing wages during the postwar
period. Contrary to what I had expected, though, there is no
general sign that the strike terms have had greater relative
effects on the upward movement of wages during the recent period
(1965-74) than during the earlier era (1955-64). However, the
relative effects of the strike activity variables do exhibit a
cross-national pattern that reinforces previous remarks
concerning the role of labor militancy versus trade-union power
in the wage inflation process. The pattern is best revealed by
taking the ratio of the strike activity average wage inflation
effects to the averaqe impact attributed to the macroeconomic
terms, i.e. by calculating
biXi (strikes)/biXi (macroeconomy).
Table 3 gives the results, which are based on the data on
Table 2. The averaqe impact ratios indicate that in both
suboeriods strike activity was more important than the
aacroeconomic variables in explaining wage inflation in the
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Table 2 Relative Importance of Unemployment, Prices, and Strike Activity
in Structural Models of Wage Inflation ( based on results of equations
6-6c)
F(t) F(t-1) V(t-1) 1/U(t) ' p'(t) p'(t-l) p'(t-2)
Italy
beta coefficient 0.411 0.576 0.152 -0.302
b .X (1955-64) 1.38 4.91 1.23 -2.12
b X. (1965-74) 3.27 7.87 1.77 -3.54
France*
beta coefficient 0.375 0.319 0.644
b.T (1955-64) 4.51 0.900 3.09
b.i (1965-74) 5.03 1.03 3.69
Great Britain
beta coefficient 0.529 0.392 0.460 0.578
b.i (1955-64) 1.28 1.27 4.48 2.04
b.iX (1965-74) 3.80 2.18 2.98 4.55
United States
beta coefficient 0.406 0.591
b .X (1955-64) 3.45 0.716
b X (1965-74) 3.71 2.30
*
excludes contribution of 1968 strike wave
key: F = strike frequency
V = strike volume
p' = percentage rate of change of prices
U = unemployment rate
b iX = regression coefficient x mean
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United States and
Table 3 About Here
less important in Ttaly. France and Great Britain fall between
these polar cases, although, the French ratio implies that, as in
the United States, strikes were more imoortant than the
macroeconomy in generating upward movements in manufacturing
wages, whereas, the British ratio implies, as in the case of
Italy, the reverse. (1)
Since the impact ratios essentailly are the ratio of strike
effects to price effects, (2) if one accepts the interpretation
presented earlier that the price coefficients reflect in part the
power of trade-unions in wage bargaining, then the ratios give a
rough quantitative estimate of the influence of labor militancy
relative to union power on wage inflation. Hence, the country
rank order in Table 3 is in inverse relation to trade-union
power: the greater the effect of (reliance on?) strike activity
in wage determination, the less the power of trade-unions, and
conversely. (3) Table 3 therefore implies that
------------------------------------------
(1) Unless the contribution of unemployment (excess-demand) is
excluded from the calculation of macroeconomic effects in
Britain.
(2) With the partial exception of Great Britain, where the strike
model includes 1/U(t).
(3) The results in Table 3 are of course not altogether
independent of the pattern in the price coefficient estimates.
To a certain extent the Table is just another way of making the
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a1968 strike wave not included in strike effects
bexcluding 1/U(t) from macroeconomic effects
cexcluding 1/U(t) from macroeconomic effects
method: see text
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Italy > Great Britain > France > United States
with respect to the relative power of trade unions in wage
bargaining.
Cross-national differences aside, the influence of strike
activity on wage movements may cause surprise. It is often
pointed out, for example, that working time lost from illness is
substantially greater than time lost from industrial disputes.
Of course, time lost from sickness does not lead to upward
movements in wages; time lost from strikes does. In a more
serious vein, there are at least two reasons why strike activity
exerts sizeable effects on the rate of inflation. (1) First,
wage settlements obtained by one union or unionized sector often
become the wage bargaining targets of other unions, either in an
absolute sense, or in a relative sense as other groups of workers
attempt to maintain established wage differentials. This has
been emphasized in Phelps Brown's (1962) work on Great Britain
and in Eckstein and Wilson's (1962) 'key industries' theory of
wage movements in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Wage
settlements in one industry or sector of the economy therefore
have proportional effects elsewhere through parity bargaining.
Second, wage rates negotiated in unionized plants (strike-induced
or not) are known to influence nonunion wage settlements. If
employers of unorganized workers did not raise wages in line with
the pattern established by union settlements they risk losing
workers and, perhaps more important, expose themselves to the
(1) Taylor, 1974 covers similar ground.
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threat of unionization. This is particularly apparent in the
United States where nearly one half of the manufacturing labor
force remains unorganized.
The estimation range for the wage regressions in Tables
la-1d was intentionally not taken beyond the year 1972. The
1973-75 observations were saved for forecasting. Actual, fitted,
and forecast values of manufacturing wage changes in the four
countries are plotted in Figures 2a-2d. (The Figures apnear at
the end of the paper.) Clearly, the fitted data points from the
strike equations track the actual wage change observations rather
well, which reflects the relatively high multiole correlations
reported earlier. More important, the forecasting performance of
the strike models is also reasonably good, especially in view of
the fact that the forecast range coincides with exogenous
inflationary shocks of unnrecedented magnitude -- the
extraordinary rise in food prices and the OPEC induced
quadrupling of petroleum prices. No doubt this is why the strike
models for all countries except the United States (where the
impact of international oil onrice increases was less severe than
in Europe) gererate comparatively large forecast errors in either
1973 or 1974; the 1975 forecasts are uniformly mor.e accurate. (1)
A better way to evaluate the predictive performance of the
strike-augmented wage equations is to make comparisons with the
forecasts of an alternative model. The leading rival model is,
(1) Strike data for France was not available for 1977 andA
thereforc it was not possible to generate a 19175 forecast.
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of course, the price expectations Phillips curve of equation 3.
Table 4 reports the average and root mean square forecast errors
for each model. The strike models are clearly superior to the
Table 4 About Here
price expectations equations for Italy, Great Britain, and in
terms of PMSF the United States. Only in the case of France does
the expectations equation yield lower average and .MSE forecast
errors. Perhaps the pure expectations model is a better
approximation of the wage formation process in that country. My
own helief, or more accurately prejudice, is that the particular
forecast range (1973-74) and the fact that economy-wide strike
frequency had to serve as a proxy for manufacturing strike
frequency in the regressions for France underlies this outcome.
Tndeed, I was somewhat surprised that the strike equations
generally outperformed the pure exnectations equations for three
of the four countries in forecastinq over the 1973-75 period.
The major inflationary impulse during these years came from
international prices which would seem to give considerable
(short-run) oredictive advantage to autoregressive price
exnectation models. Therefore, I take the forecasting
performance of the strike equations to be rather strong evidence
that labor militancy should be incorporated into structural
nodels of wage inflation.
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Table 4 Forecast Errors from Expectations and Strikes-Augmented
Wage Equations, 1973-75 (percent per year)
Expectations (eq.3) Strikes (eq.6)
Italy
average error -2.08 -0.78
RMSE 4.61 4.37
France (1973-74)
average error 1.04 2.13
RMSE 1.59 3.01
Great Britain
average error -3.42 -1.03
RMSE 3.73 1.52
United States
average error 0.83 1.19
RMSE 1.68 1.34
RMSE = Root Mean Square Error
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III IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ACCELERATION AND STABILITY OF WAGES
AND PRICES
Do the strike model regressions yield any evidence that
labor militancy has contributed to the acceleration of wages and
prices experienced by all four countries since the late 1 960's?
Insofar as the domestic labor market is concerned, a steady or
declining rate of inflation can be maintained if the rate of
change of money wages does not exceed the rate of change of
prices plus he rate of change of labor productivity. In other
words, barring changes in employment, nonlabor costs and the
factor distribution of income, a sustained escalation of the rate
of inflation will occur when the rate of change of real wages
chronically runs ahead of the rate of change of labor
productivity.
To clarify matters consider the following simple system.
The rate of change of money wages is determined by the strike
augmented wage model discussed in the previous section.
(7) w' (t) = bo + h1 1/U(t) + E a(i)p' (t-i)
+ E c (ii) 5(t-i).i~ij,i
Short-run price changes are assumed to follow the mark-up scheme
(8a) p' (t) = (w -x') (t-1) + m' (t-1)
where: x' = the rate of change of labor productivity
m = the rate of change of nonlabor costs,
principally raw materials; and other terms are as definer
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earlier.
Substituting for w' in the pricing model gives
(8b) p' (t) = b! + hl 1/U(t-1) + E a (i) p' (t-i-1)
+ c(11) S (t-i-1) - X' (t-1) + m' (t-1).
Taking aO p' (t-1) to the left hand side and subtracting
(1-aO) P't-1 from both sides of the equation yields an expression
for the rate of acceleration of prices Ap'
(8c) Ap' (t) = hC + b1 1/U(t) - (1-a") p' (t-1)
+ai p' (t-2) +...+ ak D' (t-k-1) + .. c(ji)S(t-i-1)
-x'(t-1) + m (t-1)
it will prove useful to rewrite the price acceleration
function as follows
(8d) 6 p'(t) = S* + Z + m'(t-1)
where: F* = . c(ji) F(t-i-1)
I,j
Z = bO + b1 1/U (t) - (1-aO) p' (t-1)
+...+ ak p' (t-k-1) - x'(t-1).
It is now clear that labor militancy can be pinpointed as a
source of accelerating prices if S* (the strike activity wage
change effect) is nonzero and (S*+Z) > 0. (1) To illustrate,
(1) (S*+Z) > 0 does not necessarily lead to accelerating prices,
Ap'>A. Two other outcomes are rossible:
P/Y < P (falling profit share)
or
AU > 0. (falling erployment, rising unemployment)
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suppose Ea(i) = a^ and m' = h) = hi = 0, which leads to a price
acceleration function
(8e) AP'(t) = S* + Z
Ec (Ii) S (t-i-1 - (I)-aO) p'(t -1) - x'I(t- 1)
(The French and 11.S. acceleration expressions would take this
form, for example.) Equation 9e implies that trade union strike
activity contributes to the acceleration of prices to the extent
that the strike activity wage effect on average exceeds the sum
of price changes not compensated for by the price adjustment
coefficient aO and the rate of change of labor productivity x'.
Put another way, labor militancy underlies accelerating prices if
S* pushes real wages up faster than x'.
The relevant data for assessing the direct contribution of
strike activity to accelerating prices over the period 1963-15
appear in Table 5. To smooth out cyclical fluctuations
Table 5 about Here
in wages, prices, productivity and so on the data have been
averaged over three subperiods: 1963-67 (a period of
decelerating prices in all countries except the U.S.), 1968-72 (a
period accelerating Prices in all four countries), and 1973-75
(the period of the (OPFC - induced inflationary burst)
Alont ht te arg-ument -conce.rning (S*4Z) and Ap'I does not
hinge on the precise form of the price mark-up scheme (8a).
Related pricinq equations -- for example, the "normal" averaqe
cost model -- would yield similar results for p' averaged over a
few periods.
Table 5 Average Rates of Change of Wages, Prices, Labor Productivity and Strike-induced Inflationary Impulses
1963-1975
























































































































Key: Ap' = the first difference of p'; the mean rate of acceleration of inflation.
w' = mean rate of change of manufacturing hourly compensation
mean rate of change of consumer prices
mean rate of change of real manufacturing iourly compensation






The data presented in Table 5 show that during the first
subperiod, 1963-1967, the rate of price inflation was falling in
Italy, France and Great Britain, and rising by just under 1/3
percent per year iin the United States. (see column 6 of the
Table). However, in all countries the rate of change of real
wages laqqed behind the rate of change of labor productivity (the
lag was dramatic in the U.S. -- see column 5) , and everywhere S*
+ z was less than zero. Clearly there is no evidence that labor
militancy contributed to the steady acceleration of prices
experienced by the United States over the 1963-67 period.
For the second period, 1968-72, the picture is mixed.
Prices accelerated in all four nations during these years. The
acceleration was substartial in Italy, France and Great Britain;
modest in the United States. T* + T is negative in France and
United States (as is r'-x'), which again implies that labor
frilitancy did not generate the acceleration. In Great Britain
S* + Z is greater than zero, but too small to explain fully the
sharo rise in the rate of inflation. (1) However, in Italy the
data in columns 5 and 9 of the Table show that labor militancy
was on average pushing up real wages much more rapidly than the
rate of qrowth of labor productivity. There is good reason to
conclude, therefore, that the most important source of price
acceleration in Italy during this period was trade union "cost
push."
(1) Also notice that (r'-x') is negative.
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The 1973-75 average rate of price acceleration was enormous:
nearly five percent per annum in Great Britain, more than three
percent per annum in Italy, and almost two percent per annum in
France and the United States. In view of the dramatic increases
in the international prices of food and fuel since 1973, it comes
as no great surprise that the data in Table 5 indicate that the
general acceleration of prices cannot be attributed to labor
iTilitancy. For the United Ftates the estimated net effect of
strike activity on price acceleration, S* + Z, is negative. Tn
otherwords, the pressure on manufacturing money wages from trade
union strike action was apparently not great enough in the U.S.
to keen real wages growing as fast as labor productivity. C- + Z
is positive for France and Great Britain, but it is not large
enough to account for much of the price acceleration; especially
the recent acceleration of British consumer prices. (1) In Italy
the evidence again poin t s to a different conclusion. Both r'-x'
and + Z are qreater than 1. which suggests that
strike-induced wage escalation was a significant component of the
post-OPEC burst of inflation.
"dmittedly, the calculations in Eable 5 might yielt
conservative estimates of average strike-induced inflationary
impulses. Wages ani productivity pertain to the manufacturing
sector, whereas, prices are based on economy-wide consumer
(1) Notice, however, r'-x' is substantially greater than zero in
France.
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indices. (2) Since the prices of manufactured goods have
generally increased less than the consumer price indices in
recent years, the strike activity inflation effects may be
understated somewhat. Taken as a whole, however, the evidence
strongly implies that only in Italy has trade union strike action
systematically contributed to increasing rates of inflation over
the 1968-75 period. (1) In order to explain the general
acceleration of wages and prices of the late 1960's and 197 0's
one must look to other factors; macro-policy mismanagement,
deficit financing of the Vietnam War, changes in the relative
prices of fuel and agricultural commodities, and so on.
Although the results of this paper indicate that
manufacturinq labor militancy has not been an important proximate
cause of escalating rates of inflation, (2) the data in Tables 2
and 5 show that the combined effects of union power and union
militancy effectively index manufacturing wages to prices in all
four countries. (3) Two implications follow. First, any
(2) Consumer pricesofcourseare more -relevant -for model-ingq
wage determination.
(1) Italian unions are not only powerful, they also are among the
most militant. For example, the Postwar average of mandays lost
in strike activity per worker is higher for Italy than any other
major industrial, capitalist society. See Hibbs, 1976a and
1976b.
(2) Except in Italy to the extent noted above.
(3) That is, the combined effects of price adjustment and strikes
keep the rate of change of real wages positive. The only
exceptions over the 1950-75 period are 1969 in France (real wages
fell by about 0.-% following a 13% increase the previous year)
and 1974 in the United States (a decline of about 1%).
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received rate of price inflation tends to he Pferpetuated.
Second, and perhaps more important, inflationary shocks requiring
real adjustments, for example changes in the relative prices of
fuel and food redistributing income to the protiucers of oil and
agricultural commodities, can generate accelerating inflation
rates if both labor and capital are in the short-run unwilling to
accent the real income loss. Therefore an "imported" inflation
can lead. to a "home-grown" inflation as a result of what Hicks
(1975) has called "real wage resistance." (1) Until the
principal domestic actors acknowledge the shift in the terms of
trade and settle the problem of allocating the decline in real
income, increasing inflation is almost an inevitable interim
outcome, particularly if political authorities attempt to
maintain a steady level of output and employment and "validate"
the inflation by expanding the money supply. (2)
If the perpetuation and in some circumstances the escalation
of inflation is irfluenced by tradp union action, what can he
done to brinq about wage and price stability? Perhaps nothing
should be done. As Tobin (1972) and others have observed
inflation is not the worst way of resolving group rivalries and
(1) As G.O.N. Worswick put it in tiestimony before the British
House of Commons' Fublic Expenditure Cowmittee: "If all of us
just took the rise ir the price of oil on the chin that would ba
one thing, but most of us do not; we say, 'Our incorme is
unchanged and prices have risen. We wish to restore our real
income.'" (cited in Miller, 1976, p. 511.)
(2) A rough formalization of this idea has already beer workel
out by Miller, 1976, who builds on the earlier work of Sarqan,
1964.
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social conflict. Moreover, much if not all of the pain
attributed to the recent inflation is actually due to the massive
real income loss caused b-y the shift in relative prices in favor
of producers of food, fuel and raw materials. Had the real loss
absorbed by urban, industrial societies (or sectors of society)
taken place around a stable price level the pain would not have
been any less unpleasant.
A "do nothing" posture may be viable in the United States.
Inflation has been runninq at below double digit figures (except
for 1974), the balance of payments constraint is not severe by
international standards, and trade unions are comparatively weak.
In France, Italy and Great Britain, however, inflation has
reached almost runious proportions. For social as well as
economic reasons it must be brought under control.
The results presented earlier in the paper showed that
outside the United States there is little evidence of a Phillips
curve and that the impact of strike action on wages is largely
independent of market forces. Yet there isn't much doubt that if
political authorities were willing to run the economy at very low
levels of activity for a prolonged period of time the power of
unions to obtain wage increases equal to or in excess of the rate
of price inflation would be broken. This of course amounts to
killing the patient to cure the disease. In any case suicidal
policies of this sort are simply not politically feasible in
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modern caoitalist democracies. (1)
If it is necessary to do something about inflation, and
orthodox deflationary macroeconomic policies are unlikely to be
effective or politically acceptable, the only alternative is
probably some form of national wages or incomes policy. In a
democratic society the success of a national wages policy hinges
on the voluntary cooperation of the trade unions. Healey's
(1970) pathbreakinq study of the postwar experience shows that
two conditions are critical for trade union cooperation:
(i) Whether or not the state directly coordinates the wages
policy, the government must command the confidence of the unions.
In practice this means that trade union based (Socialist, labor,
Communist) political parties must control (or share in the
control of) the government.
(ii) the trade union movement must be centralized to the
degree that the peak organizations exercise effective control
over the principal bargaining demands and strike decisions of the
rrajor constituent unions.
None of the countries treated in this study entirely
satisfies Heady's conditions. However, the British Labour
Government has been able to sell wage restraint to the trade
unions -- indeed severe wage restraint -- for two successive
the macroeconomic policips pursued by the Nixon-Pord
Administrations after the 1972 election in this way. For an
extensive analysis of tha political considerations see my
forthcoming paper "Why Aro U.S. Policy Makers So 'Tolerant of
Unemployment and Intolerant of Tnflation."
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years, even though the TUC (peak labor organization) does not
exercise the kind of centralized authority outlined above. (1)
To be sure it took an extraordinary domestic economic crisis,
external pressure from the international economic community, and
the promise of tax relief to low wage groups to elicit the
union's cooperation. Although a national wages policy probably
does not have a long-run future in Britain, it has helped to
alleviate the short-run, post-OPEC crisis. Perhaps this is all
one should expect.
Even a policy of short-run restraint designed to reverse the
post-19 72 wage and price acceleration is not feasible in France
and Italy unless the left opposition is brought into the
government. The economic situation is particularly acute in
Italy, where annual wage increases have exceeded 20 percent for
four consecutive years. The Ttalian Communist Party (PCI) has
been pressing for participation in the government for several
years (the "historic coirpromise"), but thus far the ruling
Christian Democrats have rejected PCT overtures. If the
Christian Democrats continue to oppose PCI government
participation, trade union wage pressure is unlikely to abate,
and Italy may slide from economic crisis into economi-c
catastrophe.
(1) In August 1975 the trade unions agreed to hold weekly waga
increases to 99 6 -- a rise of about 10 percent. Wage restraint
was even qrea+er the following year: The August 1976 aqreement
held wage increases to an average of 4.5 percent. The increase
in both years was substantially less than the rate of inflation.
It is clear that a Conservative Government could never hav3
pulled this off.
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Italy: Manufacturing Average Hourly Compensation (w') Regressions
Annual Data 1954-1972, t-statistics in parentheses

















































GLS* r I= +.500 r 1=+.281 r =-.372 r =-.383 r1=-.406 r1=-.415


















France: Manufacturing Average Hourly Compensation (w') Regressions
Annual Data 1951-72, t-statistics in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6a)
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Great Britain: Manufacturing Average Hourly Compensation (w') Regressions
Annual pata 1951-1972, t-statistics in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6a) - (6b)
Constant 5.306 4.521 2.948 9.815 2.092 -2.874 -2.699 -5.287
(1.57) (2.46) (1.41) (1.09) (1.04) (-2.32) (-1.84) (-2.67)
l/U(t) 4.432 -1.327 -0.763 1.221 1.157 6.721 6.637 6.694
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United States: Manufacturing Average Hourly Compensation (w') Regressions
Annual Data 1951-1972, t-statistics in parentheses
(1) ~ (2) (3) (4) (5) (6a) (6b) (6c)
Constant 2.471 1.816 1.753 1.991 2.100 -1.181 -1.190
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Figure 2b: France: Actual, Fitted, and Forecast Values of Manufacturing Money Wage Changes, 1951-1974
From Eq. 6c.
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U R/Y T/L V F.._
1950. NA 1.5 2.8676 24.3 45.9839 0.04006 0.33562 NA
1951. 8.27856 1.2 9.4346 23.9 46.7 0.06849 0.44324 0.964642
1952. 9.1567 2. 8.32529 18.7 47.1055 0.10377 0.30245 -4.249
1953. 4 . 87909 1.6 3.20263 19. 1 46 . 5277 0.20593 0.33852 4.56848
1954. 5.55696 1.3 1.7046 22.5 45.99 0.10377 0.36772 3.29447
1955. 6.95934 1. 4.40836 2117 46.1239 0.10466 0.47794 3.18928
1956, 8.26244 1.1 4.73776 X20 45.7447 0.17611 0.39649 0.
1957. 6.18753 1.3 3.78361 19.7 45.7894 0.81698 0.43576 2.36349
195. 6 .34022 1.9 2. 92702 1948 45.2613 0.08233 0.46643 1.73664
1959. 3.02544 2. 0.4796 21.7 44.9316 0.57304 0.60835 3.93867
1960. 6.56757 1.5 0.95234 215 4 4. 921 0.20765 0.83(69 5.76181
1961. 7.46613 1.4 3.49283 19.6 44.6104 0.19063 0.83187 0.778198
1962. 5.05018 1.9 4.03643 18.9 44.6117 0.5622 0.85856 2.4251
1963. 4.54626 2.3 1.94941 21.1 44.7323 0.1162 0.86518 5.28059
1964. 6.94284 1.6 3.22914 21.9 44.7922 0.17314 1.14556 7.04269
4: 44 1.6 3, +r2914
195 7.97512 1.4 4.65622 2.5 44.7357 0.23397 1 .237 2.96564
1966. 8.03003 1.4 3..84998 2.4 44.1319 0.11382 1.01584 3.50914
1967. 2.83995 2.2 2.45886 19.9 44.6773 0.19522 1.41603 4.3952
1968. 6.95257 2.4 4.58345 20.7 45.0022 0.45534 1.72573 6.48508
1969. 7.71635 2.4 5.29718 18.4 46.2973 0.51622 2.30217 1.30358
1970. 13.698 2.5 6.17847 17.4 49.7486 0.77887 3.10349 0.920773
1971. 13.1742 3.4 8.99782 16.4 50.2983 0.81641 1.81852 4.56867
1972. 12.283 3.8 6.6455 17.9 51.3065 1.0126 2.14837 4.03309
1973. 12.2894 2.6 8.7924 21.6 50.4986 0.72841 2.37225 6.74782
1974. 17.1768 2.6 14.8881 NA 51.5796 0.95261 2.47237 0.31395
1975. 23.7989 4.2 21.717 NA NA NA NA NA
Mean 8.646 2.019 5.531 20.4 46.481 0.373 1.133 3.014
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